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A Risk Analysis Approach to Prioritizing Epidemics:
Ebola Virus Disease in West Africa as a Case Study
Whenayon Simeon Ajisegiri,1,∗ Abrar Ahmad Chughtai,1 and C. Raina MacIntyre1,2
The 2014 Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak affected several countries worldwide, includ-
ing six West African countries. It was the largest Ebola epidemic in the history and the first
to affect multiple countries simultaneously. Significant national and international delay in re-
sponse to the epidemic resulted in 28,652 cases and 11,325 deaths. The aim of this study was
to develop a risk analysis framework to prioritize rapid response for situations of high risk.
Based on findings from the literature, sociodemographic features of the affected countries,
and documented epidemic data, a risk scoring framework using 18 criteria was developed.
The framework includes measures of socioeconomics, health systems, geographical factors,
cultural beliefs, and traditional practices. The three worst affected West African countries
(Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia) had the highest risk scores. The scores were much lower
in developed countries that experienced Ebola compared to West African countries. A more
complex risk analysis framework using 18 measures was compared with a simpler one with 10
measures, and both predicted risk equally well. A simple risk scoring system can incorporate
measures of hazard and impact that may otherwise be neglected in prioritizing outbreak re-
sponse. This framework can be used by public health personnel as a tool to prioritize outbreak
investigation and flag outbreaks with potentially catastrophic outcomes for urgent response.
Such a tool could mitigate costly delays in epidemic response.
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1. BACKGROUND
The 2014 Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak
that started in Guinea in December 2013 is the 25th
known EVD outbreak since 1976.(1) It is the largest
outbreak in history in terms of morbidity and mor-
tality, affecting over 10 countries worldwide in three
continents (CDC, 2014). In terms of the duration, it
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is also the longest and largest Ebola epidemic and the
first to affect the three entire countries inWest Africa
(Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia) including state
capitals simultaneously.(1) Nigeria, Mali, and Senegal
were other affected countries in West Africa.
Despite the scale of the epidemic, it was similar
to previous EVD outbreaks in terms of incubation
period, infectiousness, clinical course, the case fatal-
ity rate, and the reproductive number.(2) This sug-
gests that the failure to control the EVD outbreak
in West Africa is not due to innate virological fea-
tures, but may reflect the characteristics of the af-
fected countries, health systems, and the response
efforts.(2) Travel, traditional practices, and transmis-
sion within health-care systems have been implicated
in the spread of EVD to some other West African
countries and beyond.(3)
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In areas of widespread transmission, several fac-
tors have been attributed to possible difficulties in
controlling this outbreak. These include weak health
services, scarcity of health workers, traditional be-
liefs in disease causation, high-risk traditional burial
practices, high population mobility across borders,
low level of trust in authorities, and inadequate na-
tional and international response.(1)
While epidemiology is useful for disease-based
predictions and analysis, risk analysis can be used
to prioritize epidemic response and improve systems
outcomes.(4) Risk analysis is a science that helps to
understand important predictors of risks in various
fields such as security, biochemistry, toxicology, mod-
eling, climate change, information technology, and
engineering.(4) A few frameworks have been devel-
oped for programmatic risk assessment of polio and
measles.(5–7) One study also examined the impact of
various strategies on the number of polio cases dur-
ing an outbreak, and response delay was identified as
the key factor determining the size of an outbreak.(8)
A risk analysis approach had also been used to exam-
ine the cross-species transmission of pathogens in the
past.(5)
The development of an EVD risk scoring frame-
work would be useful to predict the risks and out-
come of an outbreak. Its application would enable
rapid, timely, and effective response to high-risk out-
breaks, so as to mitigate the impact of the outbreak.
While there have been studies on the clinical risk
stratification of EVD cases,(9) no study has been done
to risk-stratify the region and countries with an EVD
outbreak based on factors such as socioeconomic,
environmental, and health system. The aim of this
study was to develop a risk analysis framework to
predict the risks and outcome of an outbreak. We
used the EVD outbreak as a case study to identify
countries that were successful in rapidly curtailing
the outbreak and those that were unsuccessful. Find-
ings from the newly developed risk score framework
cannot be generalized but could be improved upon
and adapted for other infectious diseases and public
health emergencies.(9)
2. METHODS
An online search was conducted on Pubmed
and Medline using key words to search peer-
reviewed journals from January 2014 to October
2015. The websites of Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention, World Health Organisation
(WHO), and Me´decins Sans Frontie`res, media news,
human interest articles, and reports around Ebola
outbreaks from January 2014 to October 2015
were also reviewed to identify and collect data on
EVD outbreak risk factors. Other sources from
which data were also collected include gray liter-
ature and government websites of Ebola-affected
countries.
Data were collected on outbreak characteris-
tics, socioeconomic factors, cultural and behavioral
factors, traditional practices, health system, and
economic indices of each country.
2.1. Criteria for Selecting Risk Factors
Based on literature review, comparison between
countries’ outbreak situation, and reports from gray
literature and theoretical relevance,(10) some risk
factors associated with the EVD outbreak, among
several others, were identified and selected for the
purpose of risk score framework development. The
risk factors were categorized as socioeconomic, geo-
graphical, traditional/cultural, and health systems re-
lated. These consist of the followings:
(1) Socioeconomic/political
(i) Gross domestic product (GDP)
(ii) Health expenditure, total (% of GDP)
(iii) History of war/civil unrest/conflicts
(2) Geographic
(i) Nature (porosity) of country’s land border
(ii) Quarantine system and border screening
(iii) Roadways/transport network
(3) Health system
(i) Physician density
(ii) Nurses and midwife density
(iii) Density of skilled health workers (nurses,
midwives, and physicians)
(iv) Hospital bed density
(v) Availability of laboratory diagnostic ca-
pacities
(vi) Timeliness of laboratory results
(vii) Disease surveillance and response (DSR)
(4) Cultural/traditional
(i) High-risk traditional practices
(ii) Consumption of bush meat
(iii) Unsafe animal handling practices
(iv) Overcrowded living
(v) Use of unregulated traditional medicine
Criteria for assigning risk scores (see Annex I in
online supplementary file)
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Risk scores were assigned to the selected risk fac-
tors based on criteria from WHO, the World Bank,
U.N. Development Programmes, and other relevant
studies. Values from 1 to 3 were used to denote the
individual level of risk, where “1” was considered
as low risk, “2” as moderate risk, and “3” as high
risk.
A risk score framework was then developed
(Table I), which was used to compare Ebola-affected
West African countries (Guinea, Liberia, Sierra
Leone, Nigeria, Senegal, and Mali) with two devel-
oped countries (the United Kingdom and the United
States) that experienced Ebola outbreak. The values
assigned were based on different criteria as explained
under each of the risk factors and the total risk score
ranged from 18 to 46. Risk scores were calculated for
the different countries by summing scores for indi-
vidual measures as shown in Table I.
The criteria are fully explained in Annex I (on-
line supplementary file).
2.2. Sensitivity Analysis
The proposed risk framework could perform dif-
ferently based on the number of selected measures.
Sensitivity analysis was therefore done by selecting
a subset of risk factors to check the performance of
the risk framework. All criteria (18) were applied to
the selected countries and compared with fewer (10)
risk factors. The total risk scores for each country
were calculated for the 18 criteria and compared with
that of total risk score for the selected 10 criteria.
The outcomes from the scores were then compared
with the actual epidemic impact in each selected
country.
Table I. Risk Framework––Scoring Criteria
Risk Factor Risk Score Comment
1 Gross domestic
product (GDP)
Low-income
countries = 3
Middle (lower and
upper) income
countries = 2
High-income
countries = 1
The World Bank classifies countries’
GDP on the income level as high,
middle (upper and lower), and low
income.
2 Health expenditure,
total (% of GDP)
Lower third
(1.0–7.0%) = 3
Middle third
(7.1–14.0%) = 2
Upper third
(14.1–20.0%) = 1
Country’s health expenditure spread
was divided into upper, middle, and
lower third.
3 History of war/civil
unrest within the
last decade
> Five years = 3 Five years = 2 No conflicts = 1 Wars/civil unrest could destroy a
nation’s health system within two
years. The longer the war, the more
destructive impact it has on basic
amenities and the health system. This
reduces prompt response to disease
outbreak.
4 Use of traditional
healer and
high-risk
traditional
practicesa
High = 3 Moderate = 2 Low = 1 Traditional healers are associated with
high-risk traditional practices such as
the use and reuse of unsterilized
needles/sharp objects/knives for
blood-letting procedures and unsafe
burial practice. The higher the rate of
use, the higher the risk of disease
spread.
5 Consumption of
bush meat
Routine = 3 Occasional = 2 Never = 1 Consumption of bush meat has been
associated with EVD outbreak in the
past. The more frequently its
consumption, the more the
likelihood of exposure to infection.
6 Unsafe animal
handling practices
Low = 3 Occasional = 2 Routine = 1 Unsafe animal handling practices such
as not using hand gloves and not
performing hand-washing after
contacts with animals.
(Continued)
4 Ajisegiri, Chughtai, and MacIntyre
Table I. Continued
Risk Factor Risk Score Comment
7 Physician density
(per 1,000
population)
<0.1 = 2  0.1 = 1 Sufficient number of physician as well
as proportionate distribution across
the country enhances adequate
access to basic medical care.
Insufficient physicians in the
workforce is associated with
increased travel distance and time for
patient, thereby increasing the risk of
disease spread. Other associated risks
include increased contact with more
patients due to increased workload
for the physician. The World Bank
recommended a minimum of 0.1
physician/1,000 population.
8 Nurses and midwife
density (per 1,000
population)
<0.2 = 3 0.2–0.4 = 2 >0.4 = 1 Nurses and midwives form a significant
proportion of the health workforce.
They play a major role in the hospital
setting as well as other settings such
as homecare and community. The
World Bank recommends a
minimum of 0.2–0.4 nurses and
midwives/1,000 population.
9 Density of skilled
health workers
(nurses, midwives,
and physicians)
22.8/10,000
<22.8/10,000 = 2 22.8/10,000 The World Health Organization
recommends a minimum of 22.8
skilled health-care workers per
10,000 population to provide basic
health coverage. Countries that fail
to achieve this target are at higher
risk of disease spread than others.
10 Hospital beds
density (per 1,000
population)
Lower density
(0.1–2/1,000) = 3
Middle density
(>2–4/1,000) = 2
Upper density
(>4/1,000) = 1
Hospital beds are an indicator for
available resources to deliver
in-patient services both in a normal
hospital setting and during outbreaks
when patient loads are likely to be
increased. Insufficient hospital beds
are likely to increase
home/community stay, thereby
increasing the risk of infectious
disease spread.
11 Availability of
diagnostic
capacity of
infectious
agent(s) in
available
laboratory
(including
laboratory density
and laboratory
staff density)
Absent = 2 Present = 1 Availability of diagnostic capacity
facilitates prompt detection/diagnosis
of disease and confirmation of
outbreak. This therefore enhances
prompt public health intervention.
The lack of such facility is associated
with high risk of disease spread with
major consequences.
12 Timeliness of
laboratory result
<80% of result
available within
minimum
turnaround time
for test = 2
80% of result
available within
minimum
turnaround time
for test = 1
The presence of diagnostic capacity
does not translate to performance.
IDSR recommends that a minimum
of 80% of test result should be
available within the minimum
turnaround time of the test.
(Continued)
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Table I. Continued
Risk Factor Risk Score Comment
13 Disease surveillance
response (DSR)
indicators
<80% of target = 2 80% of target = 1 Risk scores were assigned to DSR using
the core capacity areas
recommended in the technical
guidelines for integrated disease
surveillance and response. 80% is the
recommended target.
14 Nature of land
border/border
security
>3 or landlocked =
3
1 or 3 sided = 2 Entirely surrounded
by water = 1
Topographic features of land borders
correlate with the degree of
pedestrian mobility and the time
required to travel across the border.
This also correlates with the
likelihood of interborder disease
spread.
15 Quarantine
system/screening
at the borders
Rarely = 3 Occasional = 2 Efficient /functional
= 1
Proper screening at the borders (air,
land, and sea) can help to identify
and prevent the spread of infection
into a country. Identified cases can be
promptly quarantined.
16 Roadways/
transportation
network
Poor = 2 Good = 1 Poor roadways/transportation networks
affect patients’ evacuation to
treatment center, specimen
transportation to the laboratory, and
contact tracing.
17 Overcrowded living High = 2 Low = 1 Overcrowded living is associated with
infection of several people
simultaneously as well as rapid
spread.
18 Use of unregulated
traditional
medicine
High = 2 Low = 1 Traditional medicine and cultural and
spiritual belief in some countries
serve as the main source of primary
care. Countries with high use are
associated with high risk (a score of
2) and those with low use have a low
risk (a score of 1).
Total Highest = 46 Lowest = 18
aHigh-risk traditional practices such as unsafe burial practices and scarification marks.
3. RESULTS
Table II compares the outbreak magnitude and
features in the six selected Ebola-affected countries
in West Africa.
The outbreak in Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, and the
two developed countries (the United Kingdom and
theUnited States) only lasted for weeks, while that of
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone continued for over
a year. The outbreaks lasted several months in these
three most widely affected West African countries
before reaching their peak, while they lasted only a
few weeks for the other countries under study.
In terms of outbreak diagnosis, the Ebola virus
was diagnosed within hours to a few days in the
United Kingdom, the United States, Nigeria, Mali,
and Senegal, whereas in Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra
Leone, diagnosis was made after several weeks to
several months from the onset of the outbreak. These
three most widely affected countries also experi-
enced a great morbidity and mortality among their
health-care workforce from the EVD outbreak when
compared with other affected West African coun-
tries, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
The characteristic features of the EVD outbreak
in the three most widely affected countries compared
to others include: all their capital cities were affected,
basic health system infrastructures were weak before
the outbreak, local health system response was poor,
and there was initial lack of cooperation with inter-
national agencies.
Tables III and IV, respectively, show the over-
all risk score for all the countries and their
scores with some selected risk factors for sensitivity
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Table III. Combined Risk Scores for West African Countries and Two Developed Countries (United States and United Kingdom)
Affected by EVD,a November, 2015
Risk Criteria Nigeria Guinea Liberia Sierra Leone Senegal Mali United States United Kingdom
1 Gross domestic product (GDP) 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 1
2 Health expenditure (% of GDP) 3 3 2 2 3 2 1 2
3 History of war/civil unrest within
the last decade
1 3 3 3 2 1 1 1
4 Use of traditional healer and
high-risk traditional practices
1 3 3 3 2 2 1 1
5 Consumption of bush meat 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 1
6 Unsafe animal handling practices 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 1
7 Physician density 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1
8 Nurses and midwives density 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
9 Density of skilled HCW 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
10 Hospital bed density 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2
11 Availability of diagnostic capacity 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
12 Timeliness of laboratory result 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
13 Disease surveillance and response 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
14 Nature of land border 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2
15 Quarantine system and border
screening
2 3 3 3 2 2 1 1
16 Roadways/transportation network 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
17 Overcrowded living 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
18 Use of unregulated traditional
medicine
2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
TOTAL 31 44 43 43 37 35 20 21
aRationale for assigning risk scores for each criterion to individual country (attached as Annex II in online supplementary file).
Table IV. Simplified Risk Scores for West African Countries and Two Developed Countries (United States and United Kingdom)
Affected by EVD
Risk Criteria Nigeria Guinea Liberia Sierra Leone Senegal Mali United States United Kingdom
1 GDP 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 1
2 Health expenditure (% of GDP 3 3 2 2 3 2 1 2
3 History of war/civil unrest within
the last decade
1 3 3 3 2 1 1 1
4 Use of traditional healer and
high-risk traditional practices
1 3 3 3 2 2 1 1
5 Unsafe animal handling practices 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 1
6 Physician density 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1
7 Nurses and midwives density 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
8 Density of skilled HCW 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
9 Availability of diagnostic capacity 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
10 Quarantine system and border
screening
2 3 3 3 2 2 1 1
TOTAL 16 25 25 25 20 18 10 11
analysis. In the overall risk framework assessment
(Table III), Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, the
three most widely affected countries, had the high-
est ranking among theWest Africa countries. Guinea
has the highest risk score among all West African
countries. The two developed countries had very low
scores when compared with the West African coun-
tries generally. A higher risk score indicates a higher
likelihood of outbreak occurrence and a higher out-
break magnitude.
When risk criteria were reduced from 18 param-
eters to 10, the new risk scores for each of the coun-
tries followed the same pattern of the overall risk
scores (Fig. 1).
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Fig. 1. Sensitivity analysis: a comparison of coun-
tries’ extended (18) risk score with a simpler set
(10).
4. DISCUSSION
A risk scoring framework is a useful tool for
predicting the impact of infectious disease outbreaks
as well as those of public health emergencies. This
would inform the decision to initiate prompt re-
sponse to mitigate the impact of such outbreaks. A
higher risk score indicates the need for a more proac-
tive, aggressive, and prompt response compare to a
lower risk score. Risk scores and health preparedness
indices could also help to improve disease surveil-
lance and strengthen planning and engagement at the
community level.(11)
This risk scoring framework is a tool that can be
used by local and state governments, health organi-
zations, and other stakeholders to rapidly assess and
predict the outbreak characteristic and plan control
measures.
In this study, we developed a risk scoring
framework (Table I) that could be used to prioritize
epidemic response, predict the impact and extent
of an outbreak, and therefore enhance rapid and
effective response in outbreaks of high risk. We
showed that the overall risk score for Ebola-affected
countries correlated well with the magnitude
and impact of the epidemic in each coun-
try, with the worst affected countries, Guinea
(score = 44), Liberia (score = 43), and Sierra Leone
(score = 43) scoring highest, and the United States
(20) and the United Kingdom (21) scoring lowest.
Nigeria had the lowest risk score (31) in all the West
African countries. We further demonstrated that a
simplified framework with fewer measures performs
equally well in predicting risk. This indicates that a
complex scoring system with multiple parameters
is not necessary, and that for utility in the field, a
shorter scoring system can be used.
Such a risk scoring system, if in use prior to the
2014 EVD epidemic, might have flagged the need for
urgent intervention by WHO and improved the re-
sponse time. In the case of the West African Ebola
outbreak, there have been criticisms of the severely
delayed international response, with the outbreak
documented in March 2014 but sustained control ef-
forts not undertaken until August/September 2014,
close to the peak of the epidemic.(12) Epidemics rise
exponentially, so every day of delay averted saves
lives.
Such a risk scoring system could have correctly
predicted that the risk of the outbreak in Guinea,
Liberia, or Sierra Leone would be extremely high.(13)
The predictive parameters of the risk scoring frame-
work can further be demonstrated by comparing the
outcome of the EVD outbreak in the less affected
West African countries with the three most widely
affected countries.
In Nigeria, it was observed that early detec-
tion of the virus through accessible diagnostic facil-
ities, as well as swift quarantine and contact tracing
procedures, was central to the success of curtailing
the outbreak swiftly in Nigeria.(13) The same diagnos-
tic capability also aided containment of the outbreak
in Senegal and Mali.(14) These all correspond with
a lower risk score in the health system. In Guinea,
in contrast, it took several weeks to months before
the initial cases were detected,(15) a factor associated
with a higher risk score. This prolonged period of
exposure to Ebola virus before detection generated
many cases and several chains of transmission, in-
cluding into the capital, Conakry, which made the
outbreak difficult to control.(16) When diagnostic fa-
cilities became available in the course of the out-
break, the local capacity was quickly overwhelmed,
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which is another factor associated with higher risk.(16)
This same factor also expedited the transmission of
the virus into Liberia and Sierra Leone.
Other factors associated with lower risk scores
such as effective and prompt contact tracing in ad-
dition to adequate infection control practices cor-
related with reduction in the geographic range and
size of EVD outbreaks.(17) Nigeria replicated the
structure and system of its well-established Po-
lio Emergency Operation Centre to combat the
EVD outbreak.(6,18) The country promptly deployed
about 200 health-care staff for contact tracing(19)
and within a month, over 26,000 homes were vis-
ited and over 18,000 people with EVD contacts
were interviewed.(6,9,18) The contact tracing teams
were able to trace every generation of contact and
those who escaped quarantine were tracked down
and brought under supervision.(9,20,21) Contact trac-
ing was also very prompt and effective in Sene-
gal and Mali. The staff strength in Mali was par-
ticularly increased by training and engaging medical
students.(14)
In contrast, in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra
Leone, insufficient health-care staff, difficulty and
lack of ability to trace contacts, and failure to isolate
infected individuals complicated the outbreak.(17) In
places where contact tracing occurred, isolation and
monitoring were deficient.(22)
The existing structure of the health system be-
fore the outbreak has also been found to be central to
the outcome of the EVD outbreak. The health-care
systems in Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone are
associated with high-risk scores as they were weak
before the outbreak, with a severe shortage of health-
care workers.(18) The impact of decades of wars
and civil unrest (high-risk factors) in those coun-
tries increased the risk and impacted health systems.
Those years were marked with fleeing health-care
workers, infrastructure destruction, and interruption
of supplies of drugs and medical equipment.(23) Nige-
ria has a robust health system compared to Liberia,
Guinea, and Sierra Leone, and has higher health
professional density and more advanced surveillance
experience in other disease conditions, which was
leveraged in responding to the EVD outbreak.(18)
The polio program experience in Nigeria played a
critical role in stopping Ebola transmission.(6) Sene-
gal and Mali also have relatively well-funded health
systems.(14)
While there was a high level of coordination
among, and cooperation with, local and interna-
tional response agencies during the outbreak in
Nigeria,(24) fear and distrust in the government and
the health system characterized the outbreak in
Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone.(25) This has re-
sulted in hiding of infected patients, escape of con-
tacts from the surveillance system and patients from
the treatment centers, high patronage of traditional
healers, and hostility to both international and na-
tional response team.(22) The impact of traditions and
culture on epidemics cannot be underestimated.
A country’s resources are also in correlation with
the extent and outcome of the outbreak. Nigeria
has the highest GDP in Africa and ranks 23rd in
the world.(18) The government, some private orga-
nizations, and individuals were able to quickly mo-
bilize funds and all needed resources to contain the
outbreak.(26) In contrast, the three most affected
countries are in the group of the world’s poorest
countries.(22) This is due to the impact of wars and
civil unrest on the economy. Another consequence of
this poverty from civil unrest is a high rate of unem-
ployment, leading to high mobility across the porous
borders of the three countries.(22) This high inter-
border mobility has resulted in transnational impor-
tation and reinfection of the EVD, thereby making
containment difficult.
Other factors that helped Nigeria in contain-
ing the EVD outbreak were: ensuring safe and
dignified burial practices with a ban on national
and international corpse transfer,(27) establishment
of diagnostic centers, treatment centers, and re-
search groups across the six geopolitical zones of
the country, effective audio-visual and social media
communication, especially on infection control prac-
tices and destigmatization,(26) as well as strengthened
Port Health surveillance.(20,28)
In contrast, behavioral, cultural, and traditional
practices fueled the EVD outbreak in Liberia,
Guinea, and Sierra Leone.(25) About 60% of cases of
EVD have been linked with unsafe burial practices
such as washing, kissing, and touching of corpses.(22)
The use of traditional healers in these countries is
very high(25) and spread of Ebola virus in a significant
chain of transmission in the Sierra Leone outbreak
was associated with attending the funeral ceremony
of a traditional healer who died after treating EVD
patients.(29)
Nigeria and Senegal may not be directly com-
parable with the three worst affected countries
because the former countries had ample time to pre-
pare and prevent the outbreak.(18) Further, the out-
break in both countries started with a single case,
which made contact tracing easier. However, the fact
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remains that they were well positioned and resourced
for containment of the outbreak, while the three
worst affected countries had several common risk
factors that propagated the outbreak and its impacts.
These would have been flagged as needing urgent
intervention with availability of a risk score frame-
work.
The United States had a score of 21, while the
United Kingdom scored 22, far lower than the low-
est score of 32 (Nigeria) in West African countries.
The risk score, if applied before the outbreak, would
have predicted a low likelihood of outbreak, less sig-
nificant impact, and easier containment in developed
countries when compared with the developing coun-
tries such as the West African countries.(25)
One of the limitations of this study includes the
fact that some of the criteria for assigning risk scores
were based on gray literature sources, which may
not have a proven statistical basis. Another limita-
tion is based on the fact that some of the risk fac-
tors may not be suitable for all infectious diseases
(e.g., mosquito-borne infections). Further, this tool
was made for Ebola and has not been validated for
other diseases.
Finally, our aim was to develop a risk framework
that has multiple components that can be used to
rapidly assess and predict the outbreak risks for a
country in terms of likelihood of spread, epidemic
preparedness, magnitude, and impact. It is flexible
and can be improved upon.(30) This can aid prioriti-
zation of epidemic response and timely intervention.
5. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have developed and demon-
strated the utility of a risk score framework for epi-
demic response. Criteria that reflect socioeconomic,
geographical, traditional/cultural, and health systems
related parameters can be used to identify countries
at high risk of catastrophic outcomes in terms of mor-
bidity andmortality. This framework can bemodified
and used by epidemiologists and public health per-
sonnel as a tool for identifying and prioritizing the
need for urgent intervention in global epidemics and
may reduce costly delays in response.
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